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Winter and Discontent: The December Crises of the
Asquith Coalition, 1915–1916
Martin Farr
I
The history of British politics and the First World War can be simply expressed
in outline. There were three ministries: the Liberal Government under
H. H. Asquith elected in 1910, which took Britain into war four years later;
the Coalition formed in May 1915 also under Asquith; a second coalition, formed
in December 1916, under David Lloyd George, which presided over the
armistice, won the subsequent general election, and would last a further four years
until October 1922. The December Crises of the Asquith Coalition, as they may
be called, are important as illustrations of politicians at war: the crises were
inextricably both personal and political because each centred on the authority of
the Prime Minister, and each concerned the conduct of policy. Those issues
mattered even more than usual as the government was a coalition and the empire
was at war. The first December Crisis required a still predominantly Liberal
Cabinet to accept conscription, the second required the Prime Minister to cede
authority over the running of the war, with disagreeable consequences for his
associates and for the general direction of the war. These catalytic crises are
centrally relevant to understanding the politics and the conduct of the war, and
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the fate of the Liberal party, as well as offering broader insights into politics,
leadership, diplomacy, human agency, and contingency.1
A great deal has been written on British politics and the war in general
terms.2 As much goes for the concerns here: of the role of ideology,3 of ‘escalation’
and ‘compulsion’ as principles of war policy,4 and of conscription as a particular
policy.5 The ‘high politics’ nature of executive authority and decision-making has
naturally lent itself to biographies, and to biographical studies, of the leading
figures.6 Insofar as existing studies have analysed the myriad crises that plagued
British government throughout the war, they have tended to focus on the events
of May 1915 and the formation of the Asquith coalition,7 or on the events of
1 The author is grateful to Professor Philip Williamson, Professor R. I. Moore, Professor
Patrick Salmon, and Professor Hew Strachan, for their comments on an earlier draft, and to those of
two anonymous reviewers. Where no source is given for manuscript references, the documents were
part of the uncatalogued new accession to the McKenna papers, Churchill Archives Centre,
Cambridge.
2 The pioneer was A. J. P. Taylor, ‘Politics in the First World War’, Procedings of the
British Academy, 45 (1959): pp. 67–95; John Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and
Conflict, 1915–1918 (New Haven, 1992) is the nearest to a comprehensive account, but concentrates
on the Lloyd George coalition than on that which went before; David French, British Strategy and
War Aims (London, 1986) centred more on strategic deliberation.
3 Martin Farr, ‘Left, Right: the Forward March of Liberals Halted’, Journal of Liberal
History, 47 (2005): pp. 30–35.
4 Martin Farr, ‘A Compelling Case for Voluntarism: Britain’s Alternative Strategy 1915–
1916’, War in History, 9 (2002): pp. 279–306; Steven Lobell, ‘The Political Economy of War
Mobilization: from Britain’s Limited Liability to a Continental Commitment’, International Politics,
43 (2006): pp. 283–304. As central as the strategic questions are to the subject of this paper, space
limitations allow them to be mentioned only in passing.
5 Roy Douglas, ‘Voluntary Enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee’, Journal of Modern History, 47 (1970): pp. 564–585;
R. J. Q. Adams and Philip Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900–1918
(Basingstoke, 1987); Keith Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1915–1918 (Manchester, 1988); John
Gordon Little, ‘H. H. Asquith and Britain’s Manpower Problem 1914–1915’, History, 82 (1997):
pp. 397–409. Fresh perspectives are still being found: George Bailey, ‘Modern Project Management
and the Lessons from the study of the Transformation of the British Expeditionary Force in the
Great War’, Management Decision, 43 (2005): pp. 56–71.
6 John Grigg, Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912–1916 (London, 1985); Bentley
Brinkerhoff Gilbert, David Lloyd George: the Organizer of Victory 1912–1916 (London, 1992);
George Cassar, Asquith as War Leader (London, 1994); Barry McGill, ‘Asquith’s Predicament:
1914–1918’, Journal of Modern History, 39 (1967): pp. 283–303; R. J. Q. Adams, Bonar Law
(London, 1999); Martin Farr, Reginald McKenna 1863–1916: Financier among Statesmen (New
York, 2008).
7 Stephen Koss, ‘The Destruction of Britain’s Last Liberal Government’, Journal of
Modern History, 40 (1968): pp. 257–277; Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War, July 1914 to May
1915: a Prologue to the Triumph of Lloyd George (London, 1971); Martin Pugh, ‘Asquith, Bonar Law,
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December 1915 and the adoption of conscription,8 or on the events of December
1916 and the formation of the Lloyd George coalition.9 The dominant narrative,
such as it is, has been the path to the triumph of Lloyd George,10 and more
broadly, the strange downfall of the Liberal Party.11 Part of the historiographical
problem is that once the chronicles were written, they tended to stay written.12
A number of primary sources, or those first accounts by historians to take
advantage of the opening of personal and institutional archives since the 1960s,
were so vividly written as to create a clear sense of time and place. Only with new
sources could fresh perspectives be offered, and such sources were rare.
Of the many historiographical debates, the most prominent here is whether
relations between Asquith and Lloyd George were damaged by the latter forcing
compulsion in general, and conscription in particular, upon the former, or
whether Asquith was resigned to the abandonment of what supporters might call
‘liberalism’, and was mainly concerned with managing opinion outside Cabinet,
and managing Liberals within. It is the view of this article that there was clear and
consistent cleavage but one that could have been managed in December 1916 as it
had exactly a year earlier, but for the actions of one participant. The discovery of
the private and personal papers of Reginald McKenna – Home Secretary at the
outbreak of war, and promoted to Chancellor of the Exchequer on the creation of
and the First Coalition’, Historical Journal, 17 (1974): pp. 813–836; Peter Fraser, ‘British War Policy
and the Crisis of Liberalism in May 1915’, Journal of Modern History, 54 (1982): pp. 1–26.
8 R. J. Q. Adams, ‘Asquith’s Choice: the May Coalition and the Coming of
Conscription, 1915–1916’, Journal of British Studies, 25 (1986): pp. 243–263.
9 J. M. McEwan, ‘The Press and the Fall of Asquith’, The Historical Journal, 21 (1978):
pp. 863–883; J. M. McEwan, ‘The Struggle for Mastery in Britain: Lloyd George versus Asquith,
December 1916’, Journal of British Studies, 18 (1978): pp. 131–156; Richard Murphy, ‘Walter Long,
The Unionist Ministers, and the Formation of Lloyd George’s Government in December 1916’,
Historical Journal, 29 (1986): pp. 736–745; R. J. Q. Adams, ‘Andrew Bonar Law and the Fall of the
Asquith Coalition: the December 1916 Cabinet Crisis’, The Canadian Journal of History, 32 (1997):
pp. 185–200.
10 Michael Fry, ‘Political Change in Britain, August 1914 to December 1916: Lloyd
George Replaces Asquith: the Issues Underlying the Drama’, Historical Journal, 31 (1988):
pp. 609–627.
11 George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (London, 1936); Trevor
Wison, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914–35 (London, 1966).
12 Most significantly, Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War 1914–1916 (London,
1959), and Men and Power (London, 1956), through him A. J. P Taylor, and through Taylor a
generation of historians publishing in the 1970s. But see: John Stubbs, ‘Beaverbrook as Historian:
‘Politicians and the War, 1914–16, Reconsidered’, Albion, 14 (1982): pp. 235–253; George Egerton,
‘The Lloyd George ‘War Memoirs’: A Study in the Politics of Memory’, The Journal of Modern
History, 60 (1988): pp. 55–94; Andrew Suttie, Rewriting the First World War: Lloyd George, Politics
and Strategy 1914–1918 (London, 2005).
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the Asquith Coalition in May 1915 – offered the potential for a new perspective.
Not only was he, with Sir Edward Grey, and R. B. Haldane, among Asquith’s
most loyal ministerial associates, Asquith chose to abandon Haldane, who was
similarly systematically traduced by political opponents both in Westminster and
Fleet Street, rather than McKenna, when the coalition was formed. Additionally,
and in a way not really appreciated heretofore, McKenna’s wife Pamela played a
political role which increased in importance after Asquith’s estrangement from
Venetia Stanley, one relationship that has been very well appreciated.13 Insofar
as any participants can be rescued from the condescension of posterity, the women
of Edwardian and Georgian Liberal politics are leading candidates. Still
disenfranchised until the 1918 Representation of the People Act, that they had
no material influence on who was in the House of Commons did not mean that
they had no effect on them once they were there. The papers available since the
1960s were only a partial selection of what was available; the new discoveries give
empirically new interpretations because they demonstrate more clearly than before
the conduct of the Prime Minister, and his network of friends and associates.
McKenna and his wife are important because they were both close to the Prime
Minister, and in different ways were sources of support and influence;
increasingly, arguably, destructively. Pamela McKenna also helps unlock the
wider role of women, too often overlooked in the discussion of high politics in the
years before emancipation, not least as intermediaries. ‘I am most discreet’, her
friend, the Cabinet minister J. A. Pease told her, ‘except when I write to Cabinet
Ministers or their wives’.14
Such a study is intended to demonstrate how personalities, and political
manoeuvring, affected policy, in national – and imperial – circumstances without
precedent; indeed circumstances never repeated: subsequent coalitions, perhaps
with some kind of political folk memory, were much more coherent than that of
May 1915-December 1916. There was a ‘learning curve’ in governing, just as
13 Martin Farr, ‘‘Squiff’, ‘Lliar George’, and ‘The McKennae’: the unpersuasive politics
of personality in the Asquith Coalition, 1915–16’, in Making Reputations: Power, Persuasion and
the Individual in Modern British Politics, eds. Julie Gottlieb and Richard Toye (London, 2005),
pp. 29–42. Some of Asquith’s female relations have been public for some time. His correspondence,
heavily edited: Desmond MacCarthy, ed., Letters to a Friend [Hilda Harrisson], 2 vols (London,
1933); Michael Brock and Eleanor Brock, eds., HHA Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford, 1982).
Asquith’s letters to Stanley’s sister, Sylvia Henley, were utilised in Cassar, Asquith as War Leader.
Among the unpublished collections of correspondence known to exist are those with Ettie
Desborough, Kathleen Scott, and Violet Tree. Lloyd George maintained a comparable relationship
with Frances Stevenson, whom he was to marry.
14 J. A. Pease to Pamela McKenna, 17 August 1915.
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there was a learning curve in the fighting.15 The scale could not have been
greater, concerning Britain’s continued participation in a world war, and the
precise nature of its contribution to waging war in an alliance with France and
Russia, maintaining the support and involvement of the ‘British world’, and
particularly of the United States. Britain’s principal global engagements were
determined in London SW1, but in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the
Middle East, a succession of disasters added to the pressures of that eighteen
month period. Peripheral geographically, they had cumulatively metropolitan
consequences, and the contrast is striking between the great events without and
the squabbling within.
II
In British politics, everything in the war before December 1915 was a prelude to
the debate over conscription, and everything after it was a consequence. Its story
was the story of the Ministry. The continued existence of the increasingly loosely-
affiliated Asquith Coalition depended upon, if not reconciling, then at least
accommodating, the expressed wishes of each warring section. It was a more than
semantic distinction. Political and personal interests were brought to a head by
the first December crisis, and found to be resilient enough for the administration
to persist, if not to flourish. There was, after all, a great issue at stake: the denial of
decisive influence to opponents. Self-preservation was as animating an impulse in
Westminster as it was on the Western Front. For his part the Prime Minister,
H. H. Asquith, took the matter personally, as he was increasingly to do. ‘Today,
alas! The sky is covered with clouds and thick darkness, and a thunderbolt has
fallen’, he wrote to a close friend.16 Earlier in the day, that friend’s husband, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna, had resigned. The passage
through Parliament of the Military Service Bill, which brought in military
conscription for unmarried men between the ages of 18 and 41, was indeed
the most problematic of all wartime legislation in a period of continual
extemporisation and innovation, although not as extemporised or innovative as
some wished and agitated for. The state was seeking to compel men to kill; for as
unprecedented a measure as could be imagined, to a nation and empire which had
hitherto waged war without recourse to such necessities, the difficulties were not
perhaps disproportionate.
15 Gary Sheffield, ‘Military Revisionism: The Case of the British Army on the Western
Front’, in Michael Howard et al., A Part of History: Aspects of the British Experience of the First World
War (London, 2008), chapter 2. See review, British Scholar, II (2009): pp. 165–167.
16 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 28 December 1915.
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The formation of the Coalition on 25 May 1915 – for The Times, the
following morning, already ‘the most remarkable government in our history’ –
soon revealed the difficulty of effective statecraft at a time of effective
uncertainty.17 Asquith was discomforted, complaining to Pamela McKenna of
having to ‘rub shoulders with uncongenial and unfamiliar personalities’.18 With
the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey’s progressive political disenchantment
and physical disability, and the Minister of Munitions David Lloyd George’s
increasingly ambiguous yet ambitious political posturing, Asquith came to depend
on Reginald McKenna more than he did on any other minister by the winter of
1915: ‘The PMs only confidant’, according to Charles Hobhouse, one of the
Liberal cabinet ministers abandoned when the Coalition was formed.19 There
were others similarly resistant to coalition primarily for partisan reasons, but also
to the escalation of the war it betokened: Walter Runciman, President of the
Board of Trade, Sir John Simon, McKenna’s successor as Home Secretary, and
Herbert Samuel, who succeeded Simon, being the most prominent. McKenna has
usually been described simply as an opponent of conscription; more nuanced
observers have emphasised his resistance as being on grounds of cost rather than
morality. His position was actually a combination of each, but part of a much
more systematic advocacy of the type of war being fought. For Asquith, ‘[i]t
saddened him’; his disappointment derived not least from having his own doubts
assuaged through a similarly acute sense of the balance of subtleties upon which
a satisfactory resolution of the issue rested.20 Pressures political and electoral,
financial and arithmetical, converged as one upon Asquith, one upon whose will
office, if no longer necessarily the issues, ultimately depended. It was a perilous
position for the Prime Minister, which McKenna’s ‘dizzy gyrations’ did little to
steady.21
So, when Lloyd George complained in November 1915 that ‘we were now
living under a McKenna regime’, he was not motivated, entirely, by pique.22 Their
relationship was poor, and got worse, and centred on Asquith. The complaint
of the erstwhile Chancellor was one founded on the superficial irritation born
of his successor’s intimacy with the Prime Minister. ‘Wh[at] counts for most’,
Margot Asquith asked Pamela of her husband, ‘his love for Henry or his hate
17 ‘The New Cabinet’, The Times, 26 May 1915, p. 9.
18 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 17 June 1915.
19 C. E. Hobhouse, diary, 14 October 1915, Edward David ed., Inside Asquith’s Cabinet:
from the Diaries of Charles Hobhouse (London, 1977), p. 255.
20 Kathleen Scott, diary, 11 February 1916, Asquith papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford
152/130.
21 Asquith to Sylvia Henley, 6 February 1916, Asquith papers 542/3/562.
22 C. P. Scott, diary, 13 November 1915, Scott papers, British Library, London, 50902.
114 Martin Farr
for LI.G?’23 The intimacy of one with Asquith was likely to preclude empathy –
quite apart from support – directed at the other. Yet McKenna’s concern as
Chancellor was not in establishing a regime so much as a regimen. This was the
cause of disagreement in most forums of decision-making, and through the
mechanisms of policy the policies themselves. Where the policy was ill-defined or
not defined at all the imprimatur of Sammlungspolitik in its purest form could be
seen. If the effect was merely stasis, a serious flaw in the war effort was evident;
progressively, stasis gave way to disruption.
Coalition government ought not to have disconcerted the Liberal Party in the
way it did. Certainly, accusations from backbench MPs or journalists of betrayal
when Unionists – led by Andrew Bonar Law and including the former Prime
Minister Arthur Balfour – and one socialist – Arthur Henderson – joined the
Cabinet mistook a change in degree for one in form. Since 1910 the Liberal
Government had been constrained by interests outside it, and was dependent on
the support of the by-then numerous Labour and Irish members, reflecting as
they did, respectively, the fracturing of both class politics and the Union. The
significant development was from a coalition of interests outside the Cabinet to a
more brittle confection within. What therefore had hitherto been but one
consideration in policy making became after May 1915 the dominant component.
That policy making had itself been an erratic and imprecise process underlined
this; the admission of Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War in May 1915
arguably had done as much as that on its own. Asquith may have engineered
partisan triumph from the political disaster of May 1915, but he had admitted to
the Cabinet room new members with both the motive and the means to transmit
their dissatisfaction outside it, to interests both more responsive and less
responsible. Ginger groups within Parliament and newspaper editors and
proprietors without had virtually been admitted to Cabinet themselves.
Demonstrable political dissent was less important than the signal it transmitted.24
The Coalition of 1915 was presented – as were those of 1916, 1931, 1940,
and 2010 – as the collaboration of diverse means for a common end. In intent it
may have been envisaged by some as an exercise in forward planning, but in effect
was anything but: it was offered by a Prime Minister weakened by criticism and
fearful of the electoral verdict that (by his own government’s constitutional
innovation, the 1911 Parliament Act) had to be delivered no later that the autumn
of 1915. The coalition was a product of crisis: the ‘shells scandal’, the disastrous
Dardanelles campaign, the resignation of the First Sea Lord (and close friend of
McKenna, a former First Lord of the Admiralty), ‘Jacky’ Fisher. If Liberal doubts
23 Margot Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 28 December 1915.
24 ‘The Recruting Crisis’, The Manchester Guardian, 17 March 1916, p. 7.
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about the war had been allayed by the continuance of Liberals in the key offices
of state after May 1915, the infection of Unionism presaged compromise:
compulsion, conscription, and all that came with them. Liberal concerns were as
much cultural as political. These were, after all, politicians who had been at war
for four year before hostilities with Germany had begun, as the targets of the ‘new
politics’.25 When Asquith confided to Pamela in May that ‘I prefer a Cad with
Liberal ideas to a Gentleman with none’,26 he was not expressing his preferences
for coalition-building. In the view of disgruntled Liberal backbenchers the row
over the apportioning of comparatively marginal offices to the leading Tories was
a distraction. The grievance was their presence in any capacity; Asquith hoped
that by balancing personnel, policy would follow. The unwelcome guests were
merely ‘disfigurements of the landscape’.27 As far as the warmth of the Liberal
family was concerned, Margot implored Pamela of her husband that ‘I hope he
will never let Ll. George’s name cross his lips.’28 Margot’s husband described his
home as a ‘hellish environment’,29 where his days were filled with ‘interviews with
an almost indefinite series of bores, busybodies, and quacks’,30 while his wife
despaired of ‘K’s folly . . . Derby’s clumsiness . . . Ll.G’s treachery and baseness’.31
Such were the sinews of war.32
The greatest cleavage was that over strategy, or, an impertinent critic might
say, the need for one. That which had necessitated an army without precedent was
not the ‘continentalist’ approach against which many Liberals had long been
opposed. A mass presence was indeed sought for French soil, if not necessarily to
fight there. The problem, as far as McKenna – from his Admiralty days a
committed navalist rather than a continentalist – and his allies were concerned,
was that whatever the purpose, the effect was the same: size mattered. The larger
25 Alan Sykes, ‘The Radical Right and the Crisis of Conservatism before the First World
War’, The Historical Journal, 26 (1983): pp. 661–676; Richard Rempel, ‘Lord Hugh Cecil’s
Parliamentary Career, 1900–1914: Promise Unfulfilled’, The Journal of British Studies, 11 (1972):
pp. 104–130.
26 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 28 May 1915.
27 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 21 July 1915; Nigel Keohane, The Party of Patriotism:
The Conservative Party and the First World War (Farnham, 2010), pp. 42–53.
28 Margot Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 26 [May 1915]; Ibid., n.d. [November 1915/
May 1916].
29 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 10 September 1915.
30 Ibid., 9 July 1915.
31 Margot Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 28 December 1915.
32 Indeed, opposition to conscription was by no means universal amongst Liberal MPs:
Matthew Johnson, ‘The Liberal War Committee and the Liberal Advocacy of Conscription in
Britain, 1914–1916’, The Historical Journal, 51 (2008): pp. 399–420. Almost as many could be
described as committed conscriptionists as actually voted against the measure.
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the army the more it cost, and the greater the likelihood of its being invoked to do
more by Britain’s allies, further increasing its size. It followed that it was not
altogether clear what might constitute victory: prevailing militarily might entail
defeat economically. McKenna’s instinctive and continual cost and benefit
approach was similar to that of Kitchener, who had to balance the compelling
need for more recruits, whether to fight the war or to wage a peace, with a natural
preference for the professional soldiery.33 Not for the last time, events compelled
attitudes. The new ministry coincided with the launch of the Russian-prompted
Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns, where a British-led force of Australian,
New Zealand, Indian, and Canadian troops successfully recreated the deadlock of
the Western Front in the eastern Mediterranean; to the west, the stillborn
French-inspired Salonika campaign; to the east, at Kut al-Amara, British-led
Indian forces advancing on Baghdad were surrounded by Turks and forced to
surrender. At Calais, Kitchener, sensitive to the concerns of Britain’s allies,
pledged an army of seventy divisions to the French; in August, at the additional
invitation of the French, the British Army engaged the enemy at Loos, losing
50,000 men.34
The first December crisis was the culmination of direct concerns over politics,
economics, and strategy. It proved more seductive at the time to deal with the
separate components, if ultimately less satisfactory. The limit of available
manpower as far as McKenna was concerned provided for fifty divisions; the
conscriptionists demanded seventy. By October 1915, given the parlous state of
Russia and the state of play on the Western Front, the likelihood of British troops
being committed en masse increased. With this eventuality in mind, the National
Register had been compiled during the summer, ostensibly to obtain data. With
conscription still unfeasible politically, a compromise scheme was conducted
under Lord Derby, Director General of Recruitment, as an escalation of the
National Registration Act, and a pioneering exercise in causative census: unless
sufficient numbers had attested to serve by November 1915, voluntarism would be
supplanted by compulsion. In the light of the British commitment at Chantilly
early in December to a western offensive in 1916, mere attestations would be
insufficient. ‘LG declares that conscription is certain’, McKenna told Pamela in
September 1915, ‘but the registering of men is not to be in the hands of an
incompetent War Office. Another and more efficient department must assume
responsibility for the selection of conscripts, presumably the highly successful
33 War Council Minutes, 27 January 1915, PRO CAB 42/1/25, National Archives,
London.
34 D. J. Dutton, ‘The Calais Conference of December 1915’, The Historical Journal, 21
(1978): pp. 143–156.
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office of Munitions, which is recording a series of triumphs in organisation’,
sarcasm being one weapon of which there were no shortages.35
The call for conscription then, though unwelcome to most Liberals, was not
unexpected. Throughout August the compulsionist section of the Government
colluded with the like-minded along both the backbenches and Fleet Street, more
concerned as many were with the visceral than the statistical. In September,
the supplementary report of the War Policy Committee, established under the
chairmanship of Lord Crewe, Asquith’s most reliable lieutenant, in August, called
for conscription. In October the dilemma over strategy peaked when Lloyd
George challenged Asquith over the neglect of Salonika. The soft underbelly
of the German war effort was a well-worn subject of division within the
Cabinet. Lloyd George denounced ‘pitiable’ indecision in support of Serbia while
the General Staff continued to complain that there were still too few actors to
direct, irrespective of the theatre.36 The most significant result of the evident
inelasticity of manpower was that Kitchener, having exhausted other measures,
finally came out for conscription.37 Both those supportive and opposed to
the policy recognised that Kitchener’s asseveration, on whichever side, would
be the likely determinant. That did not mean that Asquith would not, or would
have no need to, inveigle. ‘I am bridge-building’, he told Pamela, ‘a difficult
kind of architecture. But it has to be done – or at any rate attempted’.38 On
16 October he revealed to her that he had ‘circulated a little memo to rattle my
scattered colleagues in their week-end retreats’.39 Thus was the Derby Scheme
announced. Under the scheme, men were invited to join up, or to attest to join
up, but only when required, and those with wives only when the numbers of
single or widowed had been exhausted. Action, after the almost requisite
delay, produced an exemplary marriage of coercion and permissiveness. Whether
the intention was that wedlock be superseded by droit de seigneur, or whether
Asquith simply thought time would exhaust the protagonists, the effect was
that every point of contention remained, and the patience of the discontented
was further attenuated. Lloyd George complained that the Prime Minister
was ‘obdurate and obstinate and appears entirely subject to McKenna’s
35 McKenna to Pamela McKenna, 5 September 1915.
36 Frances Stevenson diary, 12 October 1915, A. J. P. Taylor, ed., Lloyd George: A Diary
(London, 1971), p. 67; Walter Long to Margot Asquith, July 1915, Long papers, British Library,
London, 62404/146; Roy Prete, ‘Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: a Study in Allied Military
Planning’, The Journal of Military History, 73 (2009): pp. 417–448.
37 Kitchener to McKenna, 31 March 1915.
38 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 13 October 1915.
39 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 16 October 1915.
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influence’.40 As Asquith narrated to Pamela, Bonar Law ‘transmitted a sort of
ultimatum to me. Monday may see wigs on the green’.41 The first was that of
Sir Edward Carson, champion of Ulster and awkward Attorney General since
the formation of the Coalition, resigning, effectively to lead opposition from
the backbenches.
Within a fortnight, the Minister of Munitions issued his own threat. ‘About
teatime (this is secret)’, Asquith briefed Pamela, ‘I received by special messenger a
kind of ultimatum from LI.G to wh. I did not reply’.42 Lloyd George and Bonar
Law had threatened to resign unless Kitchener was dismissed. ‘Happily I have got
the habit of mens aegna in arduis and slept peacefully . . . I summoned the writer,
and in the course of 20 minutes things resumed their true proportions. Then
(as I dare say you know) we had a Cabinet at which the Conscriptionists fell upon
the author.’43 During that meeting McKenna alone had opposed the move to
unseat Kitchener, admittedly as much for tactical as for strategic reasons.44 By way
of another compromise, Kitchener was sent off on a spurious mission to the
Mediterranean until December. A precedent had been established: it was the first
‘Kitchener Dodge’, the method by which Lloyd George would ensure the
Secretary for War’s absence from SW1 and thus from decision making. On the
other hand, whilst ‘I can easily reconcile myself to being away from the H. of
Commons’, Asquith admitted, he was, nevertheless, occasionally forced into
addressing it.45 Asquith confessed the significance of a speech which resounded to
the statement that conscription for married men was ‘a contingency which I do
not think is ever likely to arise’, an ambiguity erected upon similar ambiguities.46
In Kitchener’s absence, Asquith took over at the War Office, and immediately
attempted to minimise the exposure of the most disputatious elements by forming
a new War Committee for strategic deliberation to replace the Dardanelles
Committee, which had itself replaced the War Council in May 1915.47
Deliberation was, however, principally political, as was membership, which
40 George Riddell, diary, 16 October 1915, Riddell papers, British Library, London,
62959.
41 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 1 November 1915.
42 Ibid.
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soon swelled.48 McKenna demanded inclusion, further complicating the
endeavour: ‘I have been much exercised (as you know) over the composition of
this infernal Committee. It [moves] from day to day like a baffling kaleidoscope,
and the final arrangement of the warring and discordant particles [is] an almost
desperate leap in the dark’, Asquith informed Pamela.49 His appreciation of the
nature of the debate was inherently unhelpful for it offered no way of reaching
agreed conclusions and ample opportunities for delaying them: ‘I realise, and to
a large extent sympathise with, the interplaying cross-currents’.50 As a
circumstantial imperative, men again constituted matter: ‘[t]hese personal
things are more exhausting and life-taking than a multitude of political and
strategic problems’.51 So it was that a compromise had assuaged Bonar Law, a
concession had allayed Lloyd George, and a confidante had placated McKenna.
The Chancellor’s presence was the main complaint of those who had hoped
that the new committee, called into existence to redress the balance of the old,
would speedily endorse conscription. Lloyd George, noted George Riddell,
confidant and proprietor of the News of the World, was ‘much annoyed. He says
that McKenna worried the PM into appointing him and that in doing so he had
not played the game’.52 Lloyd George’s expressed understanding was that no
minister would press a claim and seek to gain preferment. ‘I stated that I was
indifferent whether I was made a member or not’, he told Riddell, perhaps, a
sceptic may have suggested, disingenuously.53 The Prime Minister’s weakness was
exposed by the episode, and for many the real soft underbelly of the war effort:
‘[t]he PM has been spending the weekend with the Jekylls [Pamela’s family]
and has no doubt been subjected to much feminine influence’, Riddell confided.
‘Mrs McK, LG thinks, has been working hard in the interests of her husband’.54
Pamela was not alone. Margot had decided to keep the Prime Minister out of
town ‘as the gossips will say that Mr McKenna ‘got at’ H[enry] . . . [McKenna’s]
well advertised hatred of LI.G make it highly important for us all to be silent –
not a word’.55 Whether or not his prophecy was self-fulfilling, Lloyd George
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found the committee ‘very unpleasant . . . McKenna opposes almost every project’
of his.56 Bonar Law gave a speech very clearly expressing his dissatisfaction,
which was applauded in the growing coalition of the critical press.57 The diffusion
of opinion within its expanded membership had the effect of further
disorientating the Prime Minister as to the nature of the challenge. As late as
16 December, he told Pamela, revealing his modus operandi, ‘I am just going to
face a large anti-conscription deputation – not (I hope and believe) Ephesian
Beasts, but nice, more or less tame, peace loving specimens from our old pre-
Coalition menagerie. How did you get on with B Law?’58
Reality was soon evident, and the seven days of the second Christmas of the
war constituted, for Asquith, ‘in the fullest sense of the word a Hellish week: one
of the worse even in my storm–tossed annals’.59 On 27 December Lloyd George
threatened to resign; the next day McKenna and Runciman actually did tender
their resignations. ‘The ground they put forward’, Asquith told Edwin Montagu,
McKenna’s deputy and husband of Venetia Stanley, ‘is not the actual decision of
the Cabinet: indeed they both say that they will not oppose the proposed bill’.60
The ground put forward was that the raising of 67 divisions would not be possible
without impairing other resources and obligations. It was a question of degree,
rather than kind, and no assurance on Asquith’s part, by or on behalf of Balfour,
or more significantly Grey, assuaged them. ‘I am afraid that this is the climax of 6
months of discontent and portent on their part. Can you and Rufus [Isaacs,] do
anything with them to-day?’ Their resignation, the war leader thundered, ‘wd be
to say the least highly inconvenient’.61
McKenna had ‘rather surprised’62 the Prime Minister by his position;
presumably in form rather than in substance. Asquith’s dilemma was therefore
twofold: the political necessity of retaining his Chancellor and principal
lieutenant, and his private sympathy with McKenna’s objections. Anything
more than private sympathy would risk the secession of the other side of the
Cabinet; the measure’s mitigating concession was that no married men would be
taken until all single men had been recruited. The economics were questionable,
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58 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 16 December 1915. The answer is not known.
59 Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 1 January 1916.
60 Asquith to Edwin Montagu, 28 December 1915, Montagu papers, Trinity College,
Cambridge, AS5/1/1/45.
61 Ibid., Walter Runciman to Asquith, 15 December 1915, Asquith papers 15/200.
Rufus Isaacs (Lord Reading) led the Anglo-French Loan Mission, and was thereafter Special
Envoy, to the United States.
62 Asquith to Sylvia Henley, 28 December 1915, Asquith papers 542/2/504.
Winter and Discontent 121
to say nothing of the morality, though neither concern had hitherto been notable
from their bearing. Fortunately for Asquith, McKenna had not been a tenured
political intimate without acquiring a similarly resilient sense of expeditious
propriety. McKenna’s approach had more chance of advancing if the proponent
were in a position to influence political decisions. For all the extemporisation of
the war effort, some conventions remained.
The view that the Prime Minister’s actions were of a pattern was as
depressing to his allies as they were infuriating to his enemies, and matters
culminated on 28 December. Runciman complained to his wife that ‘Asquith has
thrown over his friends in order to placate hostile colleagues’,63 and Asquith’s wife
wrote to McKenna’s: ‘yr husband and Mr Runciman + others feel that Henry has
come down on the wrong side . . . I sympathize. Ll.G’s speech spells his doom.
He is a hound of the flimsiest disloyal ungrateful kind’.64 The meeting later that
day was the least encouraging, Runciman went on. ‘McKenna and I went in to see
Asquith and had a most unpleasant interview’, Runciman told his wife, ‘ending
with not even a handshake’.65 They came ‘blustering in’, Asquith told Kathleen
Scott, and were generally ‘excited and not very nice’.66 Faith between believers
underwent another assault. ‘Probably he complains of us on the grounds that we
deserted him, Runciman thought, accurately.67 When Rufus Isaacs arrived at
Runciman’s house that evening on Asquith’s bidding, Runciman suspected that
that eternal emissary had been commandeered by a Lloyd George anxious to
isolate McKenna. Asquith additionally sent a letter to McKenna, Simon, and
Runciman, warning of a ‘shattering blow’ to the national interest in the event of
their resigning.68 The inevitable offer of a committee reached a Runciman finally
couched in serenity, ‘Since [Reggie] and, I were bound to leave the Asquith
Coalition it has been fortunate that the step should have to be taken at the very
moment when he and I are at the top of our reputations’.69 Nor was McKenna
obviously overwhelmed, telling Pamela that evening, ‘Crisis postponed until
tomorrow’.70
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‘A wife can play a big part in a great crisis like this’, Margot told Pamela,
demonstrating how the mobilisation of women was one way in which the high
politics of the war reflected broader social developments. If McKenna ‘really cares
for Henry and believes him necessary to our country just now he must stick to
him. A skeleton conscription will keep in all the unmarried men and more than
are wanted before we have any bill for compulsion at all. If there are too many
men for soldiers this can be easily tested and sifted afterwards . . . Henry has made
a clear definite pledge which he must keep at all costs or he goes down
forever . . . That is the whole question + by this he will be tested . . . What good
in war time is there in a man absolutely necessary to Henry resigning? What will
all of us who love him think? On what firm ground does he resign? Too many
men or fear of compulsion in any form even an outline or skeleton?’. Margot’s
priority was ‘to keep us united for this terrible war’.71 In case Pamela had missed
the point, that day she also received a despairing letter from the Prime Minister.
‘I still hope that there may be some clearance, but I am not sanguine. It afflicts me
more than I can say’.72
Two days later, Asquith told Violet Tree, ‘we had a Cabinet in the morning
which may or may not be fateful’.73 The consequences, were all ministers to act as
they had intimated, were clear to the Prime Minister when, with mandarin
celerity, Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence since
1912, fashioned a government-prolonging formula. He devised the Cabinet
Committee on the Co-ordination of Military and Financial Effort, so named to
specify the actual material grounds for grievance: ‘if an agreement could be
reached the great expansion of armies might be limited and means found for
McKenna and Runciman to remain in the Cabinet with honour’.74 The desire of
General William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to establish
some objective solidity to the General Staff’s means of support meant that he too
wanted McKenna to remain and evaluate the feasible rather than the merely
desirable. Hankey was relieved. ‘McK and Robertson met with most satisfactory
results as they partially agree on basis of 54 divisions, the utmost McKenna will
risk’.75
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There had been, for wartime, a healthy sense of self-preservation in the
Liberal reaction. Hankey’s committee was one incentive; the other incentive was
the alternative. ‘Constant conferrings between Reggie, EG and me enabled us to
take a line of action which would prevent L-G and his Tory friends forcing us
into the catastrophe of an election’, Runciman admitted.76 Fears of a ‘round up
the shirkers’ election were endemic. For non-Bill Liberals, he thought, it would
‘mean annihilation’.77 That alone served to ‘persuade one in favour [of] struggling
on the Trade and therefore the size of army point. EG holds this strongly, so does
Reggie’.78 Continuing the struggle within government was preferable, politically
if not necessarily personally, to a sudden reacquaintance with time, space, and
the backbenches. So, with the steady indentation of present and likely realities,
the dissenting ministers, with the exception of Simon, were found to be
dissuadable. ‘You ought to stand and make the best of it and persuade R McK’,79
Montagu told Grey; instead Hankey sought to persuade R McK: ‘the country
cannot afford to lose its sanest elements . . . as a friend I implore you not to
resign’.80 ‘McKenna takes the compulsion of single men as settled’, Leonard
Hobhouse told C. P. Scott, editor of The Manchester Guardian, each an
embodiment of tortured Liberalism. There were ‘fine-spun theories of the
decision being contingent and so on, but from McKenna’s manner I am
clear. . . They stole a march on us by dividing the interest of the married and the
single’.81 Orderly withdrawal, while remaining on the battlefield, was thenceforth
the priority. ‘If we succeed [with] a reduction of 20 divisions then my trade
arguments are largely satisfied’, Runciman wrote. ‘Only the principle of
compulsion on 310,000 marrieds remains’.82 McKenna and Runciman were
happily married; the crisis passed.
‘These two weeks have been hell’, Margot told Pamela, as soon as they were
over. ‘Simon thought of his convictions. Mr McKenna and Runciman think of
men and money – quite right but these things may be out of proportion – others
have thought too much of conscription others too much of freedom or tradition
and Ll.G cannot think at all . . . Loathing for L.G. on all sides Labour, Treasury,
Liberals, officials, etc’. All that was clear was that ‘[s]plitting the Cabinet will lose
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the war more than anything else’.83 With the crisis over, therefore, there only
remained the measure itself. ‘To-morrow I see no loop-holes, as I have to prepare
for and introduce this damned Bill. And then?’, Asquith asked Pamela. ‘I hate
more than I can say this new and unnatural atmosphere. It must be dissipated’.84
‘I am anxious and apprehensive . . . Surely I must be nearing the end of undreamt
of horrors and tragedies’.85 Yet the episode had served to reinforce the Prime
Minister. It may have been the case that ‘[l]istening to Simon’s [resignation]
speech this afternoon’, Asquith told Pamela, ‘I felt rather like a father who has
been publicly hit in the face by his son. These are the things one really minds’,86
but Simon, Riddell noted, was ‘very sick that McKenna and Runciman did not
stand by him’,87 and Asquith in turn thought that ‘it had been rather a shock to
McKenna to see how little the resignation of Simon mattered’.88 On the contrary,
McKenna discerned in tactful self-sacrifice motives more political than principled,
speaking later of Simon taking ‘the decision ensuring him the future Liberal
leadership’.89
McKenna comported himself in a way consonant with collective
responsibility, if not necessarily with the tenor of the Coalition. While
opposing the measure personally, he supported it publicly, and privately, as
Montagu told Asquith, ‘has been playing a noble game . . . in persuading
members to vote for the Bill’.90 Since McKenna’s doubts had always been about
the precedent established more that the principle conceded, it was the only
tenable course once resignation had been resisted. A committee – another
committee – offered time and chance. It also meant that McKenna’s strategic
conception was placed on a reformed footing because a pressing political necessity
had pre-empted what he held to be economic propriety. A leading Liberal’s
view of military conscription as being one based on economically–sustainable
increments did not inspire confidence in other Liberals whose principles were
not quite so mannered. For the future it was encouraging, however, since the
committee would ensure that McKenna’s calls would be at least indirectly heeded:
nothing beyond the capacity to provide could be effected, by definition, and
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economic capacity was his central concern. Ultimately this approach prevailed, but
not before attempts had been made by opponents to remove any restrictions.
Capacity thereafter maintained a form which permitted the war effort to continue
through military failure until the doubts of American creditors compelled
contraction in the ‘November crisis’ of 1916. ‘There is some risk’, The Times
opined, ‘that the public may be confused by the rapidity with which one Cabinet
crisis is giving place to another’.91
Gingerists advocating an escalation of the war effort included the Unionist
Business Committee, the Liberal War Committee, which included those Liberals
who supported conscription, and the Unionist War Committee, much larger and
was more representative of Unionist feeling on the issue. Nor was it considered
a domestic matter. The British world was growing in importance, and its
constituent parts became the object of the attentions of other lobbyists, such as
the Empire Resources Development Committee andthe Imperial Unionist
Association. The importance of imperial manpower for the mother country had
the unintended consequence that daughter nations were being consecrated on
the fields of Western Europe: for Australia and New Zealand at Gallipoli in
1915 and Pozie`res in 1916; for Canada at Beaumont-Hamel in 1916 and Vimy in
1917; for South Africa at Delville Wood in 1916; and even for India in the East
African, Gallipoli, Palestine and Mesopotamian campaigns.92 It was publicly-
recognised that the Dominions were an essential and growing source of
manpower.93
As important as imperial issues were in Britain having gone to war, imperial
means were increasingly recognised for its successful prosecution, and Dominions
became models. Two Liberals MPs asked that if ‘national service [for] our
daughter nation, Free Australia’ were possible, then there was no reason why it
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should not be for the mother.94 The free Australians even put the matter to
popular vote, and elsewhere conscription was held up as the only democratic
method of recruitment.95 From March 1916, on his tour of Britain,
compulsionism – and imperialism – received vocal support from Billy Hughes,
Prime Minister of Australia, who was as keen to see Asquith replaced as were
Lloyd George and Lord Northcliffe, proprietor of the The Times, both of whom
associated themselves with him.96 The visit was a great success, demonstrating the
popular appeal of forceful clarity in war matters.97 It also demonstrated the ease of
being popular far from home; Hughes lost both votes back in Australia. He was
followed, less volubly, in the autumn, by William Massey, Prime Minister of New
Zealand, who had happily handed over all to the cause.98 Even Louis Botha, of
South Africa, visited trumpeting his army engaging the enemy in German South
West Africa.99 The most frequent visitor of the Dominion heads of government
during the Asquith coalition was Sir Robert Borden, keen to use the war to
construct a stronger imperial sensibility.100 The incipient press lord Max Aitken,
who as Lord Beaverbrook would crusade for the issue, promptly published an
account of the Canadian army on the Western Front. Himself a Scots Canadian,
Aitken obtained a preface by another, the Colonial Secretary Bonar Law, and
introduction by a third, Borden.101 The war might be just what the empire
needed; the benefits of attacking Turkey, for instance, could be as much
psychological as strategic.102 Indeed, the contribution the war could make to the
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empire might be as important as that of the empire to the war.103 All served to
embolden the escalationalists in a British world at war.104
Domestically, the pressures that had provided for conscription while
preserving the ministry would not rest there. Where McKenna’s concerns were
based upon a sensitivity to existing methods and the likely effects of acceleration,
the equivalent thinking from compulsionists considered in the main no variation
other than the potential for, and the effects of, defeat. What Asquith, as the
principal mediating body, required, was a constancy that a close associate could
offer only by ignoring reality, or at least his view of it. When the Prime Minister
complained about McKenna’s contortions, it was through frustrated sympathy
rather than, simply, irritation. Contorted or not, the Chancellor was far from
contented. The novelist and family friend Arnold Bennett bumped into
McKenna’s brother in the Reform Club on 15 January, who ‘told me that
Reginald was still quite determined to leave the Cabinet if it tried to outrun the
constable’.105 Runciman was similarly inclined.106 With somnambulist efficiency
the committee conducted its business. Meetings were convened elsewhere of what
Hankey called the ‘shadow’ or the ‘real’ cabinet.107 Asquith noted during a
weekend break in the country how ‘McKenna and Hankey talked army and Bd
Trade figures half the day’.108 There were other shadow cabinets, just as there was
also the invariable negativist perspective. ‘Who can have told you that I regarded
this horrible and dangerous imbroglio as a great joke . . . was greatly mistaken’,
Augustine Birrell, one of the most pacific of Asquith’s old pre-Coalition
menagerie, told Pamela. ‘Happily for my own individual peace of mind I have no
doubt whatever that just now nobody has any business to resign’, rather there was
a novel application of what would become known as ‘attrition’: ‘The greater the
public danger in any particular or threatened course of action, the more imperative
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is the duty to remain and fight it inch by inch, and bit by bit until it becomes
impossible to remain a moment longer . . . to go away and leave the enemy in
possession is downright folly . . . To do so is to deliver over the keys of the
fortress’.109 The proprietorial imperative was yet to succumb.
III
McKenna went to see Runciman, the Cabinet’s almost perpetual convalescent,
in his sickbed, on 4 August 1916. ‘We discussed politics and agreed [the] time
has come for [the] gov[ernmen]t to go out’.110 There appeared little inclination
to share this conclusion with the PrimeMinister. ‘As for political crises, they are so
much a normal condition of our life that I cease to be greatly interested in them’.111
The Chancellor’s prominence during the climacteric first week of December 1916
was therefore perhaps unexpected, with the Treasury marginalised, and relations
with much of the Cabinet having long since broken down. That summer, in the
space of four weeks, a major naval engagement, Jutland, and a major land
engagement, the Somme, had failed.112 The general priority for the remaining
Liberals appeared increasingly one of avoiding public censure. The victory of
Pemberton Billing, a bellicose self-publicist, in a by-election in March 1916, was a
portend: a ‘Khaki’ election could have only one winner. ‘Reggie and I’, Runciman
told his wife ‘talked of all the possibilities in case of Asquith’s sudden collapse. We
must have our minds and if necessary our men’.113 Asquith had been conveying to
Pamela his own slowly deteriorating state of mind,114 and the death of his son on
the Western Front only hastened the process.115
The progessive weakening of the Prime Minister, both personally and
politically, did nothing to mitigate the heightened concerns on the part of his
allies to their prospects, or those of their policy priorities. Fear of electoral
extinction served to reaffirm the importance of Asquith, or at least of unity. For
the Asquithians, their fate and that of the Coalition was tied to the authority of
the Prime Minister, which was unfortunately the problem as by the autumn of
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1916 the authority of the Prime Minister was no longer obvious. The final arbiter
in all disputes had to remain the Prime Minister, as it did, when he chose to
arbitrate. The Chancellor, faced with the Prime Minister’s sensibility, had
justifiable cause for concern, if not for the possibility of the Prime Minister
failing, then certainly for the consequences. There was by the autumn of 1916, if
there had been before, no alternative to Asquith as war leader if McKenna wanted
to remain in office, and, indeed, retain any purchase on the war effort. Yet, as with
Runciman and Grey, McKenna had lost much of what attachment he had ever
had to the Coalition. With an appreciation of Asquith’s eloquent torment, the
sense of uncertainty was unambiguously reinforced. By November 1916 the Prime
Minister, even if he had retained that of most Liberals, had long since lost the
confidence of Unionists. Yet he could not now continue without the Liberals, just
as they could not without him. Most significantly, en masse or separately, they
were in a minority at a time when the state of the war gave no indication of
improving. Worse, too, for the Asquithians was the increasing sense that the most
likely successor would be the man who was the newly-appointed Secretary for
War, Kitchener having drowned en route to Russia on HMS Hampshire after the
cruiser struck a German mine: David Lloyd George.
As in the events of twelve months before, the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, Robertson, was central. Where in December 1915 he effected
reconciliation, in December 1916 it was division; where in the earlier instance
Robertson took the initiative, in the second his was a passive presence, which
produced aggression. ‘L.G. tried to shove me over to Russia’, Robertson
complained to Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces
in France and Flanders in November. ‘The King took up the matter strongly & it
was dropped. The idea was to let L.G. become top dog here & have his wicked
way. Like he used to get rid of poor old K’.116 The ‘Kitchener Dodge’ had been
revived as a recurring manoeuvre months after the original object of the exercise
had been lost to a German mine. In addition to an earlier effort with Robertson,
Lloyd George had tried unsuccessfully to send Grey, according to Hankey, to
Salonika, and, according to Robertson, to Russia.117 Robertson told Asquith ‘it
would be absolute folly for me to go’.118 Nor did Asquith and Hankey succeed in
sending Lloyd George to Russia.119
116 Robertson to Haig, 8 November 1916, Haig papers 3155/109.
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Yet with Robertson’s succession as CIGS, Lloyd George had cause to resist
restrictions attained and attempted. Over both the personal and the political –
authority and strategy – Lloyd George and Robertson were opposed. Lloyd
George’s enemies were likely friends of McKenna, a reasoning which led Lloyd
George and his friends to see McKenna as an additional source of intrigue as well
as of obstruction. Lloyd George’s suspicions were correct in one respect.
Robertson described McKenna to Haig as ‘a friend of ours’.120 That the leading
voluntarist could be regarded by the leading conscriptionist as a friend was
thought an illustration of Robertson’s political naivete´, as well as of the
Chancellor’s vaunted duplicity; perhaps it was merely another exigency of war.
Given their mutual sympathies, usually covertly expressed when they were
expressed at all, mutual accord between Robertson and McKenna was actually less
fanciful than it appeared, not least as the CIGS was wholly dependent on
Asquith’s patronage, a situation altogether recalling that of Kitchener.121 Of
McKenna’s attempt to use Robertson in the war of attrition within the Cabinet
there could be no doubt. There was by that point little else McKenna could do in
attempting to sustain political initiative. The ‘Nigeria debate’ of 8 November was
a focal point for the gingerists and further challenged the war as it was being
fought.122 The experience further empowered Lloyd George and the
compulsionists. A week earlier, McKenna had made an improbable trip to visit
Haig in the field, and made supportive noises above the gunfire.123 ‘I have seen
McKenna’ Robertson told Haig after the Chancellor had come back from the
front, ‘& he says he will stick to me’.124
Where collective responsibility still obtained, plotting was policy by
other processes. Robertson discerned wider ambitions in the collusion
between Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, hankering for a return to
government, and Lord French, Commander in Chief of home forces.125
When Hankey raised the subject of the ‘Kitchener Dodge’ on 9 November,
Lloyd George ‘at once disclaimed the remotest intention of anything of the
120 Ibid.
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kind’.126 At the War Committee on 21 November, Lloyd George complained
that ‘he had lost influence with Robertson owing to the fact that someone had
poisoned the latter’s mind’ with the ‘K Dodge’.127 Lloyd George told colleagues
present that it was McKenna, but admitted afterwards that he did not know who
it was, and had only guessed. The desired effect was nevertheless obtained, and
the Chancellor had been diminished in the eyes of his colleagues.128 The incident
was thereafter cited as an illustration of how, by his obsession with Lloyd George,
McKenna had made the normal operation of the executive machinery impossible.
The further damaging of relations as a result of the various ‘dodges’ was a
necessary prelude to the disintegration of the ministry. Yet McKenna’s concordat
with Robertson was not without precedent; Lloyd George’s hostility to the CIGS
had been for some time maturing; and the Secretary for War did indeed desire his
removal, permanent if possible, temporary if necessary.
As a result of the impasse within the Cabinet, members turned to routes
outside. Fleet Street was a much more significant thoroughfare during the second
December crisis than it had been in the first. It marked an evolution in distrust:
even more than war, newspapers were the continuation of politics by other means.
Ministers found grievances more eloquently – and publicly – aired in Fleet Street
than in Whitehall or Westminster. By late 1916 it was easily forgotten that there
were reasons for the separate existence of each. What for many Liberals was a
common denominator so low as to be nearly imperceptible, was for Lloyd George
and his new allies a necessary endeavour.129 The Coalition fell in part because the
newspaper editors who resisted its continuance, as with the politicians who
displayed, as W. B. Yeats would put it shortly afterwards, the more passionate
intensity. Some discerned gradual change as betokening a transformation,
with that particular vintage of (relatively) ‘new’ journalism – progeny of the
tabloid press and the previous war – compelling politics to conform to their
requirements. With the likes of Lord Milner near the centre of events, as Minister
without Portfolio rather than High Commissioner for South Africa, as he had
been during the Second Anglo-Boer War, the continuity was obvious, and the
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effect was that politicians and newspapermen had a relationship no longer defined
by distance. Attraction in abundance was felt by Unionists, who saw in Fleet
Street a useful circumambulation around the May 1915 settlement. In contrast,
the indifference of Liberals in general and Asquithians in particular to the press
was more than relative.130 It was for their opponents an attitude emblematic of
the all–too undogmatic prosecution of the war thus far, and a by then obviously
cyclical process continued. Lloyd George was responsible for the apogee – or
nadir – of that process, at the end of September, when he gave an interview to the
New York Times, forcefully repudiating nascent peace overtures.131 McKenna was
furious, complaining to C. P. Scott that the ‘affront to America was sheer lunacy’,
and one made worse by the interviewee’s doctoring of the text to accentuate his
positives; indeed he ‘had no doubt Lloyd George had written the whole thing very
likely interpolations and all’.132
The nature of the fourth estate revealed much about the changes to come.
Where the Unionist Press was one of mass-market newspapers and large
proprietors, the Liberal Press had smaller circulations and larger editors, who
regarded themselves as the equals of the politicians. Tory was better served by
what the press could offer than was Liberal. The attitude of other Liberals was
such that the effect of serious and trenchant writing was muffled; faint resonance
of the changing order. The effect of the Liberal press on the government was less
notable than that of the Unionist, except insofar as it adopted a Unionist agenda.
The lesson seemed to be less that Liberalism could not wage war than that it
could not function during war; the effect was the same. The ad hominem nature of
events masked tactful political compromise up to and including December 1916.
Individuals could be blamed even when individuals were not at fault. While
leading Liberal editors were on closer terms with Liberal ministers than Unionist
editors were with Unionist ministers, the effect was muted because the Liberal
press was less and less the mass press, unless, as demonstrated by Scott, it ceased
to be a Liberal Party liberal press at all. If Liberalism could no longer rely on
traditional constituencies, the likelihood of affecting the non-Liberal sections of
public and private opinion was reduced. Unionists had more success with their
story because it was a simpler story to telegraph; Liberalism had become too
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131 ‘Lloyd George calls all peace talk unfriendly’, The New York Times, 29 September
1916, p. 3; MacCallum Scott, diary, 27 November 1916, MacCallum Scott papers 1465/7.
132 Scott diary, 2–3 October 1916, Scott papers 50903/74; c.f. Lord Hardinge to Sir
Cecil Spring-Rice, 5 October 1916, Hardinge papers, British Library, London 36/191; Sir
Frederick Ponsonby to C. P. Trevelyan, 6 October 1916, Trevelyan papers, Special Collections,
Newcastle University Library, 60; Esher diary 29 November 1916, Esher papers 2/17.
Winter and Discontent 133
elusive a doctrine upon which to build a solid circulation. So it was that Asquith’s
disdain, and Lloyd George’s appreciation, was reciprocated.133
The measure of the press was its support for Lloyd George in December
1916. The Asquithians could count only on J. A. Spender and his Westminster
Gazette; Lloyd George could prevail at least in part because he could count as
supporters to varying extents and for varying reasons such disparate pressmen as
Scott at The Manchester Guardian, and Lord Northcliffe at The Times, Henry
Dalziel, owner of Reynolds’s Newspaper, J. L. Garvin, editor of The Observer,
Leopold Maxse, editor of the National Review, Robert Donald, editor of the
Daily Chronicle, and H. A. Gwynne, editor of The Morning Post. It was a coalition
the like of which henceforth would always matter. Politicians, having made the
press what it was in influence and stridency, feigned surprise as a party truce was
subverted and a National Government undermined in time of war. It had been
governmental atrophy that had provided for the dominance of the Unionist Press,
and since parliamentary leadership could not by then be without the Unionists, it
had to be with them. Liberal newspapermen, as with their backbench cousins,
hankered after firm leadership; there had been enough apostasies to the glory of
infirm leadership: the doctrinal consideration was minimal. Hence the appeal of
substituting procrastination under Asquith for peace under Grey. If not quite the
required deus ex machina, it was at least a proposition of sorts. The inroads of
Unionism meant, however, that any replacement for Asquith would not be a
Liberal dedicated to ending the war by negotiation, but a Liberal who would end
the war by victory, of one side or the other. So it was that Lloyd George prevailed.
Duly stimulated by his outmanoeuvring of McKenna over the Kitchener
dodge, Lloyd George issued a memorandum on 25 November, demanding a new
war committee, a ‘civilian General Staff’.134 The move reflected longstanding
concerns about the machinery of the executive. The War Committee, twelve
months old, was pregnant without expectation, as membership had increased
arithmetically and decisiveness decreased geometrically. McKenna was still
regarded as an obstacle to the form of the war effort as ideally envisaged. Since the
new committee would omit the service ministers, it would also marginalise
Robertson; as it would omit departments not directly concerned with the war
effort, it would marginalise McKenna. The Chancellor’s objection to Lloyd
George’s proposal, particularly since he would not be included, was to be
expected. Asquith duly rejected the proposal on 26 November, explicitly stating
the need for any committee to involve the service ministers. It was, however, clear
133 J. Lee Thompson, ‘Fleet Street Colossus: The Rise and Fall of Northcliffe, 1896–
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that a crisis of potentially greater significance than that of December 1915 was
developing. He declared to Pamela, with a whiff of greasepaint, ‘Alas! the
whirlwinds are blowing, and the windmills are whirling: in short I am in the
centre of an aerial tornado, from which I cannot escape’.135
On 27 November, the Federal Reserve Board in New York discouraged
involvement in British investments, publishing its warning, suitably, in the New
York Times.136 Three days later Asquith notified the King of the matter in what
would prove to be his last Cabinet report.137 The following day, 1 December,
Lloyd George met the Prime Minister, certain that it was Asquith’s presence on
the committee which was the critical issue. Since McKenna’s influence on the
Prime Minister was by then regarded as absolute, Asquith’s absence was insisted
upon.138 Lloyd George proposed a war committee of three, two of whom were the
service ministers, the third being the Chairman, obviously Lloyd George, and that
the committee would report to the Prime Minister and give orders to
departments, though Asquith would retain both the right of veto, and the
supreme authority for decisions.139 This Asquith rejected, chiefly on the grounds
that he thought the Prime Minister should be chairman. He did however,
concede the need to reconstitute the existing War Committee, and his wife
recorded, ‘begged me not to believe all the stories McKenna was spreading about
that he [Lloyd George] wanted to take my place, and was disloyal etc’.140 Balfour
thought that, once again, ‘LG had put a pistol to the head of the PM’.141 ‘I don’t
think during the war, I have had a worse 48 hours’, Asquith, by now running out
of superlatives, told Pamela.142
McKenna, Grey, and Runciman, knew their fate in the event of Lloyd
George being appointed Chairman, and, even in Asquith’s own proposal, there
appeared to be no room for the Chancellor on so pared a committee. The
preferred triumvirate was Lloyd George, Bonar Law, and Carson. Once again it
was as much the manner of premeditated action as the substance that aroused and
marshalled resistance. With Northcliffe personally intent on undermining the
Prime Minister’s authority, as he had been for some time, McKenna mobilised his
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own, rather less prepossessing, pressman with the message that ‘McKenna would
resign unless he is included in the war council’.143 ‘As you know my Sabbaths
are rarely spent in this most damnable town’, Asquith wrote to Pamela from
Downing Street on 3 December, but ‘I was forced back here by Bongie and
Montagu and Rufus to grapple with a “Crisis” – this time with a very big capital
C. The result is that I have spent much of the afternoon in colloguing with messrs
Ll. George and Bonar Law’ with the result that ‘[t]he “Crisis” shows every sign of
following its many predecessors to an early and unmourned grave. But there were
many Wigs very nearly on the green’.144
Asquith’s confidence did not survive his reading the following morning’s
Times, which carried an account of events that clearly conveyed to Asquith that
Lloyd George must personally have briefed Northcliffe to pre-empt him.145 The
report was only the most recent, but the most damning, piece of evidence that
a coup was being attempted.146 This included refusing any revised executive
machinery on which he was not the Chairman, and, indeed, speaking to Lloyd
George.147 ‘R. had an early morning letter from Margot saying the P.M. had
written to Ll.G. refusing his terms’, Pamela later told Beaverbrook. ‘Violet
lunched with me and seemed to think a modus vivendi would be reached’.148
In the Commons that afternoon, Asquith, McKenna and Runciman, could be
found sitting alone on the Treasury bench.149 Having reconciled himself to Lloyd
George’s proposals, he met McKenna on the morning of 4 December and then,
in Crewe’s words, ‘declined to become a Merovingian ruler’.150 Northcliffe
complained ‘that in every step the P.M. has taken in the crisis he has acted on
McKenna’s instructions as to what he should do’.151
That evening, the Cabinet Liberals met and Montagu proposed an ad hoc
constitutional conference to resolve the situation. ‘My suggestion was derided,
and McKenna most helpfully asked me if I wanted four Prime Ministers, or, if
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not, which one I wanted’.152 Montagu then asked what they should do ‘if they
were invited to join a Bonar Law and Lloyd George Government. McKenna said
he would have no difficulty in deciding as he was not likely to receive an
invitation’.153 The general view, led by McKenna, was that Asquith was right to
refuse any subordinate position.154 Grey equivocated, demonstrating the little will
he had to continue: liberation tangible, he wondered aloud if it was wrong to want
to be out of office.155 For Montagu, the Foreign Secretary was the key, and ‘had
tried to get hold of Grey, but had failed. McKenna had succeeded in capturing
him’.156 Hours after the meeting broke up, McKenna went at midnight to
Downing Street to bolster the Prime Minister.157 On 5 December Asquith sent
his letter of resignation to the King, expecting to be preferred as Prime Minister
over Lloyd George, who had also resigned, with Bonar Law.158 On 6 December,
the King invited Lloyd George to be Prime Minister.159 ‘I have been through the
Hell of a time for the best part of a month, and almost for the first time I begin to
feel older. In the end there was nothing else to be done, tho’ it is hateful to give
even the semblance of a score to our blackguardly press’, Asquith told Pamela later
that day, when he had heard – and had declined to serve under his successor:
‘colleagues to-day were unanimous in thinking – what seems obvious to me –
that it is not my duty to join this new government in a subordinate capacity. Apart
from the personal aspect of the matter, it would never work in practice. So we are
all likely to be out in the cold’.160 McKenna telegrammed his friend, the Liberal
MP William Wedgewood Benn: ‘Asquith and all his late liberal colleagues in
Cabinet are absent from new government’.161
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Intransigence had been mutually reinforced. There had still existed
differences in outlook between McKenna and Lloyd George, in terms of the
pace of the war effort, in terms of strategy, and in terms of personnel. Those
differences were not in fact as great as either thought at the time, or others
subsequently. What it did mean was that the second obstacle, of enmity, was the
one that was effective. Eighteen months of mutual denigration had rendered any
working arrangement inconceivable, not to say impractical, even if Lloyd George
had been prepared to have McKenna in the new, lean, War Committee.
McKenna, having endeavoured throughout to elevate the concerns of the
Treasury to the consciousness of the Cabinet, would not have been prepared to
serve simply as a member of a Cabinet to which executive decisions were cursorily
referred for assent, or (perhaps recognising the irony) as a departmental chief
whose decisions were decided by other departments. For McKenna to remain
in the Cabinet, Asquith would have to retain both the Premiership and the
Chairmanship, which was unacceptable to his arrogator. McKenna thus
convinced Asquith, reinforced by the Prime Minister’s own reluctance to accept
demotion, particularly as the fallen fruit of agitation by underlings. That Lloyd
George ascendant meant McKenna absent was secondary.
Asquith’s own temptation to abandon his Chancellor and effect a renewed
working arrangement with Lloyd George rested on his Chancellor’s political
isolation. Nothing but further dissent and discontent would flow from retention.
Moreover, the Prime Minister would better withstand McKenna’s departure
than he would that of Lloyd George. How close he came to abandoning
McKenna was never clear, and remained another measure of subjectivity.
Asquith’s draft memorandum of 25 November omitted McKenna from a civilian
General Staff; others maintained that that was Asquith’s position as late as 1
December.162 Montagu wrote, as much perhaps in hope as in expectation, that in
the new administration Runciman would go to the Admiralty and Crewe to
the Exchequer, the option Asquith had deliberately not pursued in May 1915.163
The rationale for so controversial an appointment no longer obtained. The
consensus was that McKenna would go. Montagu in fact expounded the view that
McKenna urged Asquith’s continued resistance in the hopeful expectation that he
be forcibly removed from office ‘because his difficulties at the Exchequer are
notoriously insurmountable’.164
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The degrees of disaffection within ministerial Liberalism constituted the
impenetrable core of the second and final December crisis, and were central to the
subsequent inquests. Some ministers wanted Asquith to resign and watch Lloyd
George fail to convert vapour into matter, so heralding the indispensable’s second
dispensation; others wanted Asquith to resign because they themselves had.
McKenna, motivated more than anyone else to confound ‘Lliar George’165 was
also the remaining willing spokesman for restraint in the conduct of the war. Grey
clearly lacked the will, Crewe the energy, and Montagu and Samuel the seniority,
and Runciman the health.166 Sufficient Liberal support could be ensured for
McKenna’s removal, for while most Liberals remained attached to Asquith, and
would have preferred him to continue in harness with Lloyd George, there was
some mistrust of Asquith’s lieutenants. Praetorian weariness, and the abrasion of
political antennae, meant that there was little remaining support; competence
was as potent a manifesto as any promised policy changes. Loyalist Liberals thus
despaired that through a clash of style as much as of substance between his
principal lieutenants, the Prime Minister was the victim; the Chancellor was, by
most impressions, the principal wrecker.167
IV
‘This is a bit of a cataclysm isn’t it’, the former Prime Minister wrote, with
a noticeably shaky hand, to Sylvia Henley.168 The personification of the period
had precipitately curtailed Liberalism’s belle e´poque. Whether that moment came
in December 1916, or December 1915, or May 1915, or, indeed, August 1914,
depended on which Liberal was asked. Once the Coalition was replaced
with another, there was correspondingly little that could be employed. While
the new regime was an unalloyed success in the eyes of neither the public
nor the General Staff, there was by that point, in an overused phrase,
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‘no alternative’.169 While the disintegration of the Asquith Coalition was not one
of degree – there had never really been much coherence – the Lloyd George
Coalition was at least bound by the sinews of formerly displaced opposition.
Asquith’s concern throughout was that if personnel could be balanced – a balance
of men as much as of measures – then stability would ensue, stability from which
conduct of the war could be rationally assessed. It was not an executive conception
to enhance the reputation of Asquith as first among equals, not least because the
personnel were such that commonalty of ends was unlikely when there was no
agreement on commonalty of means. Thus McKenna and Lloyd George both
thought of themselves as applying reason in the face of dogmatism.
The Government as it was constituted in May 1915 was an exercise in
artificial life. That it lasted eighteen months was regarded as a testament to the
determination of the Prime Minister, and that it fell as it did was adduced as a
demonstration of his insoluble irresolution. Neither quality need have been
decisive. The Coalition was a problem not of form so much as of intent. The
impediment was not that there were too many ministers, but that there were two
men of contrasting conceptions of the war Britain and its empire were fighting
who found themselves as the spokesmen of those alternatives. By December 1916
there had been both strategic coalescence and personal contraposition. At the end
the ministers who had participated were in any case no longer on speaking terms,
and personal antagonism was so compressed by pressures outside the Cabinet that
it soon reached a readily combustible form. The difference between the Asquith
and the Lloyd George Coalitions was that the later ministry was composed
of individuals above issues. Those individuals were, moreover, free from
departmental responsibilities in a way not possible before, when departments
pioneered their own progress. The new regime marked an organisational rather
than a strategic upheaval.
There was one respect in which the Asquith Coalition reflected Liberal
priorities, as expressed colloquially by McKenna, Grey, Simon, Runciman and
Hankey: political requirements were not advanced in a summary fashion, and
thereby summarily incurring dissent which in turn would undermine the consent
upon which everything ultimately rested. Adopting conscription earlier than
January 1916 would have meant losing the Liberal wing of the Cabinet and
destroying the Government. Resisting the calls for conscription for much longer
than the ministry was in the end able to, would probably have prompted the
secession of the Unionist/Georgian section of the Government, and a similar fate.
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What Asquith did was manage public and parliamentary opinion through
increments, and prepare for conscription while keeping nation, or at least
coalition, together. It was a considerable achievement, but a model of political
promiscuity.
The December Crises were the Asquith Coalition writ small. Themes
recurred: dependence on the Prime Minister, which came to be supplanted by the
dependence of the Prime Minister; fulsome dissatisfaction from every quarter; the
succour and agency of women; a pall inside the Cabinet Room; the incessant
rustling of newspapers. The Coalition having been born of division, a harmonious
development was unlikely. This provided Fleet Street with orientation, and
pressmen came to desire the promise of news more than they did its reporting
(another development to endure). Where in December 1915 they found
themselves in thrall to events, in December 1916 they could shape them,
sustained as they were by the exertions which had enervated the ministry. Perhaps
Asquith, ‘the last of the Romans’ himself, did feel betrayed, though not by
orthodox dissenters. Asquith had followed the advice of those closest to him, only
peremptorily to find himself first among erstwhiles. This may explain a starchy
letter written to McKenna shortly after, while Pamela found herself apprised of
Asquith’s inner thoughts less frequently.170 Yet in his last two years as Prime
Minister, Asquith, deaf to the overtures of those who were to prevail, remained
wedded to a man apparently isolated by recent events just as he has been by
subsequent consideration. It is doubtful that McKenna, unlike Grey and
Runciman, wanted to be invalided out of the war, if only because it would have
left their enemy commanding the field of battle. Obstacles had been negotiated,
or, rather, not negotiated, as a result of the working relationship of the likes of
Lloyd George and McKenna. Never close, and temperamental opposites, the two
Welsh MPs were driven apart decreasingly by a divergence of political will, and
increasingly by a divergence in political method. Asquith’s tragedy was that,
having considered personnel politically, he did not realise that the personal was
also political. If politicians realised that that which is ironic is often that which
prevails, episodes such as the second December crisis might never occur. Perhaps
if historians became Cabinet ministers they would not. The inevitable ironies
were that there was by December 1916 little in the way of disagreement, and
everything in the way of animosity. The debate between manpower and strategy
had been resolved, if politicians counted as manpower.
170 Asquith to McKenna, 17 December 1916.
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